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On Feb. 9, President Ernesto Zedillo issued arrest warrants for five leaders of the Zapatista National
Liberation Army (EZLN) in Chiapas, including the group's prominent spokesman "Subcommander
Marcos." The arrest orders ushered in a new army offensive in Chiapas to militarily wipe out the
guerrillas, marking an abrupt end to the cease-fire that had remained in effect since January 1994.
Now, a tense military lull grips the zone, since Zedillo has temporarily ordered the army to halt
offensive action to allow one more chance for peace negotiations. Speaking on national television,
Zedillo said the arrest orders were justified because federal agents had uncovered a conspiracy by
the EZLN to "engage in new and greater violent acts, not only in Chiapas, but also in other parts
of the country." He said federal authorities had confiscated weapons caches near Mexico City and
Veracruz, which he said the rebels were going to use for attacks on federal facilities.
"In order to protect the population, to stop further violations of the law, and new violent actions
by the EZLN, the government must immediately assume its constitutional duties to guarantee the
security of Mexicans and maintain social peace," Zedillo said in his speech. In announcing the
initiative, Zedillo identified Subcommander Marcos as Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente, a former
university professor and son of a well-to-do businessman from Tamaulipas state. During public
appearances since the uprising of the EZLN on Jan. 1, 1994, Marcos has worn a ski mask to hide his
true identity. Despite Zedillo's claim, there appears to be strong public skepticism that Guillen is
indeed Marcos. The daily newspaper Reforma, which conducted an informal survey of 400 residents
of Mexico City, found that roughly 50% of the respondents doubted that Guillen is Marcos.
Additionally, almost 59% of those responding to the poll said they considered Marcos a "leader"
and not an "outlaw," as claimed by President Zedillo when he ordered the arrest. Nevertheless,
to follow through on his order for the arrest of EZLN leaders, Zedillo immediately sent federal
soldiers to Chiapas to seek out Marcos and other leaders. As of Feb. 14, federal troops had moved
deep into Zapatista territory, capturing the town of Guadalupe Tepeyac, which was one of the key
bases for the EZLN. During the sweep, the army arrested one alleged EZLN leader, whom they
identified as Jorge Javier Elorreaga, or "Subcomandante Vicente." The Zapatistas, meantime, did
not resist the army incursions, and instead chose to move deeper into the Lancandon jungle. The
Zapatistas, however, did not retreat quietly. In a communique issued on Feb. 11, the EZLN accused
the government troops of committing human rights abuses, including air bombardment of four
areas near the towns of Morelia and La Garrucha.
The EZLN statement said thousands of civilians had been forced to flee their homes after the army
dispatched its troops. The army mobilization was backed by helicopters, with ground support from
small tanks. The Interior Secretariat (SG) and the Attorney General's Office (PGR) immediately
issued statements denying the Zapatista claims of bombings of Morelia and Garrucha. A PGR
statement said the government's pursuit of rebel leaders was being done "legally and with strict
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respect for human rights." For his part, Marcos in a public statement issued late on Feb. 12 denied
that he was Guillen. He also said that the US had pushed Zedillo to act in Chiapas. According
to Marcos, the US had demanded strong action against the Zapatistas as a central condition for
US efforts to garner US$50 billion in financial assistance to bail Mexico out of the economic crisis
brought on by the peso devaluation (see SourceMex, 02/01/95).
Earlier, in a Feb. 10 interview with La Jornada daily newspaper, Marcos had warned the Zedillo
administration that the troop incursion could rapidly deteriorate into a bloody war. "What follows,
if no one stops it, is total guerrilla war," said Marcos. Notwithstanding Marcos's statements, a
separate rebel communique hinted that the EZLN was still open to talks with the government if the
Zedillo administration agreed to cancel the arrest order for Marcos and other Zapatista leaders. "We
reiterate our readiness for dialogue and to find a political solution to this problem, but on condition
that the pressure on Subcommander Marcos be called off," the EZLN said. The troop incursions into
Chiapas and the orders to arrest Marcos and other EZLN leaders drew a massive protest from EZLN
supporters in Mexico City. According to some estimates, more than 100,000 people filled Mexico
City's Zocalo Square on Feb. 11 to demand an end to army intervention in Chiapas and a negotiated
solution to the conflict.
Partly in response to public opinion against the operation, on Feb. 14, Zedillo ordered troops to
suspend their military offensive in Chiapas in their pursuit of EZLN leaders, although he stopped
short of ordering the withdrawal of soldiers from the state. In issuing the directive, Zedillo called
on the federal army to restrict its actions to routine patrols and urged the EZLN leadership to
make clear its negotiating position so that a "fair, honorable and final solution" could be reached.
Meanwhile, debate is growing over the reasons why President Zedillo ordered the military action
in the first place. Many political and economic analysts agree with Subcommander Marcos that
Zedillo's decision to go after EZLN leaders may have indeed been the result of pressure from
multilateral institutions and the US government to resolve the situation in Chiapas, which has left
foreigners reluctant to continue investing in Mexico. At the same time, there is strong concern that
Zedillo's actions could worsen, rather than improve, the political and economic climate in Mexico.
"I think he is taking a really big gamble, this could go horribly wrong," one diplomat told Reuters.
On a related matter, on Feb. 14 Chiapas Governor Roberto Robledo Rincon announced his
resignation. Robledo who had assumed office on Dec. 8, 1994 insisted that his decision was based on
a "personal conviction" and not on pressure from either the PRI or the PRD. He expressed hope his
decision would contribute to the peace process in Chiapas. As one of the conditions for negotiations,
the EZLN had demanded that Robledo resign and that Amado Avendano the PRD's candidate for
the Chiapas governorship be allowed to assume the position. Nevertheless, to replace Robledo as
interim governor, the Chiapas legislature has nominated Julio Cesar Ruiz, also a member of the PRI
and a representative in the federal Chamber of Deputies. Avendano, while not nominated to assume
the gubernatorial post, will probably represent the PRD whenever new elections to replace Robledo
are scheduled. There was no immediate reaction from the EZLN regarding Robledo's decision to
step down, but Avendano told reporters that the resignation was only one step in bringing peace
back to Chiapas. According to Avendano, for example, federal troops must withdraw from Chiapas
as a prerequisite for peace. (Sources: Excelsior, 02/10/95; United Press International, 02/10/95,
02/12/95; El Universal, La Jornada, 02/10/95, 02/13/95; Spanish news service EFE, 02/09/95, 02/14/95;
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Reuter, 02/09/95, 02/11/95; 02/12/95, 02/14/95; Associated Press, 02/11/95, 02/12/95, 02/14/95; Notimex,
02/12/95, 02/14/95; Deutsche Press Agentur, 02/14/95)
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